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Are the major European wine exporters able to price 
discriminate across their EU extra wine export 
destinations? 
Imre Fertő, Jeremiás Máté Balogh 
Abstract  
In recent decades, New World has increased its wine export to European markets and 
became considerable in the global wine competition. However, the export share of traditional 
wine producers has decreased; Europe still remained market leader on world wine market. 
Moreover, the global wine market is characterised by progressively concentrated production, 
France, Italy and Spain accounting for about 50% of world wine production. Consequently, it 
is important to investigate what kind of pricing strategy the largest wine exporters of the 
world including France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Germany can employ in their foreign wine 
export markets. The pricing behavior of five European wine exporters in their major 
destination markets is examined using a pricing-to-market (PTM) model for noncompetitive 
and exchange rate related pricing behaviour between 2000 and 2013. The results suggest 
that France and Italy were able to pursue price discrimination in many wine export 
destinations by contrast this advantage was not observable in a case of Spain, Portugal and 
Germany. The analysis of the asymmetric effects of exchange rates on wine export prices 
suggests that in many cases the depreciation of Australian, Hong Kong’s; Singapore’s dollar 
relating to euro had a greater impact than the appreciation while appreciation of Canadian 
and Singaporean dollar exceeded the effect of depreciation. 
 
JEL: Q17, F13, F14 
 
Keywords: price discrimination, pricing to market (PTM), wine industry 
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Képesek-e az európai vezető bortermelők 
árdiszkriminációt alkalmazni az EU-n kívüli borexport-
piacaikon?  
Fertő Imre, Balogh Jeremiás Máté 
Összefoglaló  
Az utóbbi évtizedben a világ borpiacán jelentős változások figyelhetők meg. Az újvilági 
bortermelő országok jelentős mértékben növelték borexportjukat az európai piacokon és 
jelentős erőfölényre tettek szert a globális borpiaci versenyben is. Ezzel összhangban az 
európai, tradicionális bortermelők exportrészesedése folyamatosan csökkent a világpiacon. 
Jóllehet az európai borexportőrök még továbbra is versenyképesek maradtak, az újvilági 
országok borexport-részesedése folyamatosan növekszik. Emellett megállapítható, hogy a 
világ borpiaca erősen koncentrált, a termelés közel 50 százaléka Franciaországra, 
Olaszországra és Spanyolországra korlátozódik. A tanulmányban öt nagy európai bortermelő 
ország árazási viselkedését vizsgáljuk meg a legfontosabb exportpiacaikon a piaci árazás 
modelljének (PTM) segítségével 2000 és 2013 között. Eredményeink szerint Franciaország 
és Olaszország képes árdiszkriminációt gyakorolni több borexport piacán, ezzel ellentétben 
Spanyolország, Portugália és Németország esetében a piaci dominancia nem volt 
megfigyelhető. A valutaárfolyamok borexportárakra gyakorolt aszimmetrikus hatásainak az 
elemzése kapcsán megállapítható, hogy az ausztrál, a hongkongi és a szingapúri dollár 
euróárfolyamhoz képest mért leértékelődésének hatása magasabb volt, mint a helyi valuták 
felértékelődése. 
 
JEL: Q17, F13, F14 
 
Tárgyszavak: piaci árazás modellje (pricing to market – PTM), borexport, európai 
bortermelők, aszimmetrikus hatás 
INTRODUCTION 
Significant changes have taken place in the world wine market in recent decades. First, New 
World wine producer countries have increased their wine export to European markets and 
they became considerable market players. Second, the export share of European wine 
producers has decreased simultaneously, however, despite the strong competition of New 
World winemakers, the traditional wine producing countries still remain the largest suppliers 
and play important role at the global market. Third, the world wine market is characterised 
by progressively concentrated production.  
According to the British Liv-ex Fine Wine Index, 84 of the 100 most famous wine brands 
in the world are French. The 12 leading wine-growing countries account for 84% of 
worldwide production, estimated at 247 million hectolitres. France, Italy and Spain have 
been alternating in first place, together accounting for about 50% of world wine production 
(BNP Paribas, 2015). On the other hand the concentration in the wine industry differs across 
countries. However, in New World producers the wine industry is much more concentrated 
than in Old World producers, in France, Spain or Italy, the first 8 largest firms represent 30% 
of the total country production (Coelho and Couderc, 2006, p. 15). 
In the Old World one-eighth of sales are from the four largest firms and the large publicly 
listed firms dominate the wine markets of New World (Anderson and Nelgen, 2011, p. 30). 
Consequently the major traditional European wine exporters enjoy market power in New 
World. In addition, New World countries import notable wine from the top European wine 
exporters, for example USA import more than 45% of its wines from Europe. Based on these 
facts, it important to analyse that? Are the European wine exporters able to exploit its market 
power at the New World market? What are the characteristics of these wine export markets? 
The main aim of the study is to investigate the pricing behaviour of the major European 
wine exporters (France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Germany) in the New World market 
between 2000 and 2013. There are three specific objectives for the paper. First, whether 
European exporters are able to price discriminate across various markets. Second, we analyse 
the nature of price discrimination, whether it is market specific or exchange rate influenced, 
or both. Finally, we investigate the asymmetric effects of exchange rate changes on export 
prices. 
A number of empirical studies have been conducted based on the PTM model in 
international trade literature. On the other hand, these models are quietly missing in wine 
trade that is why we focus on the literature of agri-food trade. Early empirical PTM studies 
focused on manufactured goods and there has been limited research on agro-food products 
(Pick and Park, 1991; Lavoie, 2005; Jin, 2008; Pall et al., 2014; Pall et al., 2013).  
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Krugman (1986) used US-German trade data and concludes that PTM occurs but its 
research was limited to transportation equipment and machinery industries. Consequent 
work by Knetter (1993) suggested that PTM altered between industries and exporting 
countries. However, policy-makers have become increasingly interested in pricing behaviour 
in agri-food trade (Gafarova et. al., 2015; Varma-Issar, 2016; Pall et al., 2014) as well, the 
OECD (2013 p. 29) notes that competition issues in the food sector are complex and require 
further research.  
Articles applying PTM models in agri-food industries refer to commodity or 
manufactured products. PTM studies on agri-food commodity products incorporate grain 
products such as Japonica rice (Griffith and Mullen, 2001), Canadian wheat (Lavoie, 2005), 
Russian wheat export (Pall et al., 2014) as well as the analysis of wheat export in Kazakhstan, 
Russia and Ukraine (Gafarova et al., 2015) and in the European Union (Dawson et al., 2014).  
As concerns the processed products, the PTM research investigated the US meet sector 
(Saghaian and Reed, 2004) and German beer industry (Fedoseeva and Werner, 2016). 
By contrast, the monopolistic competition and potential market power of wine sector are 
not investigated in the international trade literature; especially in case of major European 
wine exporters. 
METHODOLOGY 
Krugman (1987) introduced the model of price discrimination induced by changes in bilateral 
exchange rates called pricing to market (PTM). The perfect competition assumes that prices 
equal marginal cost (p=MC). On the contrary, in the case of imperfect competition prices are 
not always equal marginal cost (p≠MC). If the exporting country’s currency depreciates, 
import prices do not change equivalently and thus, relative world prices can be affected. As a 
result, the export price implicitly contains a destination-specific mark-up over marginal cost; 
exporters can charge the importing countries based on their demand characteristics (Pall et 
al., 2013). 
Pricing to market (PTM) refers to the “destination-specific adjustment of mark-ups in 
response to exchange-rate changes” Knetter (1993, p. 473). This implies that currency 
changes are not fully transmitted into export prices with divergent movements in different 
markets (Krugman, 1986).  
The price discrimination can be considered as the optimal decision of a profit maximising 
exporter.  A profit maximising exporter has a chance to exercise price discrimination in an 
import market only when the importer’s residual demand elasticity is inelastic. Otherwise, in 
the case of elastic residual demand, price discrimination cannot occur (Goldberg and Knetter, 
1997; 1999). 
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The PTM model has received considerable attention as it tests whether exporters can 
differentiate their prices between destinations markets, providing an insight into the degree 
to which trade is characterised by a lack of convergence in market prices across export 
markets (Krugman, 1986; Jin, 2008).  
To investigate the relationship between export prices and destination specific exchange 
rates and to determine the presence of price discrimination in international trade, we employ 
the PTM model developed by Krugman (1987). The regression equation for pricing to market 
model can be calculated as follow (Knetter, 1993): 
 
lnPit= βi lnERit + θt+λi+ uit   i=1,…,N t=1,…,T (1)  
 
where lnPit is the wine export unit value in euro to importing country i in period t in 
logarithm form, lnERit represents the destination-specific exchange rates expressed as units 
of the domestic currency in euro in logarithm form, 
θt are common time-specific effects,  
λi are country-specific effects,  
βi are the PTM-coefficients or the elasticity of the export price with respect to exchange rate 
changes.  
 
Since the model is estimated in logarithmic terms, represents the elasticity of the 
domestic currency export price with respect to the exchange rate. The estimated parameters 
βi and λi can be used to distinguish between different scenarios of export pricing behaviour 
(Knetter, 1993), see Table 1. If the estimated coefficients (βi and λi) are statistically 
significant, imperfect competition and price discrimination across destination countries exist 
(PTM effects occur). As follows two different case of price discrimination can be 
distinguished. 
The first one assumes a constant elasticity of demand with respect to the domestic 
currency price in each importing country leading to constant mark-up over marginal cost 
(βi= 0). This mark-up can differ across destination countries, which implies λi≠0. The 
country effect variable (λi) captures the constant quality differences. Therefore, a significant 
estimate of the country effect (λi≠0) does not necessarily indicate imperfect competition. The 
second case of PTM behaviour is that the optimal mark-up by a price-discriminating entity 
varies across destinations (λi≠0) with changes in bilateral exchange rates (βi≠0). 
8 
 
Table 1 
 Relationship between estimated parameters and different market scenarios 
λi βi Market scenarios 
Not significant Not significant Perfect competition, imperfect 
competition with common mark-up 
Significant Not significant Constant elasticity of demand higher 
than constant mark-up, which can differ 
across countries 
Significant Significant 
 
Varying elasticity of demand higher than 
varying mark-up, which can differ across 
countries (imperfect competition) 
Positive Amplification of exchange-rate effects 
(PTM effects) 
Negative Local-currency price stability (LCPS) 
higher than PTM effects 
Source: Knetter (1993)  
 
In addition, Knetter (1993) distinguishes between a positive (βi>0) versus a negative 
(βi<0) coefficients of exchange rates (βi). A negative βi coefficient implies that exporters do 
not pursue a constant mark-up policy, but rather stabilise prices in the buyer currency 
(indicating behaviour of local-currency price stability - LCPS). Otherwise, a positive βi 
coefficient signals that exporters intensify the effect of destination-specific exchange-rate 
changes through destination-specific changes in the mark-up. If both, country effects (λi≠0) 
and destination-specific exchange-rate changes (βi≠0) are significant plus exchange rate 
effects are positive (βi>0) it signal PTM effect and imply that exporter country is able to price 
discriminate on their export destinations.  
The equation (1) could be re-specified to test for asymmetries in the response of export 
prices to exchange rate changes. Interaction terms of the dummy variable with the exchange 
rate can be included in the model to capture the differential impact of appreciation and 
depreciation (Knetter, 1993; Vergil, 2011). The interaction of the dummy variable with the 
exchange rate is specified as follows: 
 
Et = (β1 + βα2 Dt )Et = β1 Et + β2 Dt × Et (2) 
 
A dummy variable assumes a value of 1 for periods of appreciation (a fall in Et) and 0 for 
periods of depreciation and is specified in the following manner: 
 
Dt = 1 if ΔEt > 0 (i.e. the appreciation of the exporter’s currency); 
Dt =0 if ΔEt < 0 (i.e. depreciation of the exporter’s currency). 
 
9 
 
Accordingly, equation (1) can be specified as follows: 
 
ln pit = θt + λi + β1 (ln e1t ) + β2 (ln e2t ) + uit (3) 
ln pit = θt + λi + β1 (ln e1t ) + β2 (ln e2t × Dt ) + uit (4) 
 
In the equation (3) and (4), the interaction term is expressed to capture asymmetry in the 
exchange rate fluctuations. If its coefficient is statistically significant and has a positive sign, 
the effect of appreciation of exporter’s currency exchange rates on export prices is greater 
than in depreciation. Similarly, a negative significant coefficient implies that the effect of 
depreciation of exchange rates on export prices is greater than appreciation (Byrne et al., 
2010). 
Our sample comprises monthly wine export panel data of top 5 European wine exporters 
for EU extra wine export destination markets, from January 2000 to December 2013. The 
strongly balanced panel includes a number of export destination countries and 14 years 
period. The wine export data of the analysis derived from EUROSTAT international trade 
database in HS 6-digit level, product code 2204211 given in Euro and in kg. Exchange rates 
come from the European Central Bank, Statistical Data Warehouse database (local foreign 
currency in euro). The wine export prices (lnxuv) as dependent variables are represented by 
wine export unit value (euro/kg) and the exchange rates expressed as units of the importer’s 
currency per unit of the exporter’s currency (lnxrate).  
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Regarding the EU-27 major wine exporter countries, France, Italy, Spain, Germany and 
Portugal had the highest export share comparing to EU-27 extra wine trade, between 2000 
and 2013. The top 5 market leaders in the EU represented 91% of EU-27 total wine export 
targeted to the EU extra markets during the analysed period (Table 2). These countries can 
be considered as the largest European wine producers and exporters, especially France at 
42% and Italy at 30% at export share 
 
 
 
                                                        
1wine of fresh grapes, incl. fortified wines, and grape must whose fermentation has been arrested by the addition 
of alcohol, in containers of smaller than 2 litre, excl. sparkling wine 
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Table 2 
Wine export share of major European wine exporters, 2000-2013 
Wine exporter country 
Export share in EU-27 extra wine export 
(%) 
France 42% 
Italy 30% 
Spain 10% 
Germany 5% 
Portugal 4% 
Total 91% 
Source: own composition based on EUROSTAT (2015) database 
 
Based on the sample data the United States, Canada, Switzerland, Japan, Hong Kong  and 
China can be entitled as the largest European (EU-27) wine export destinations during the 
analysed period (Table 3). These destinations represented the 87% of the EU-27 extra wine 
export. Table 3 illustrates that vast amount of European wine was shipped mainly to long 
distance and Asian countries such as USA, Canada, Hong Kong and China. 
Table 3 
The top 10 largest EU extra wine export destination of EU-27, 2000-2013 
Export destinations 
Export share in EU-27 
extra wine export 
United States 36% 
Canada 11% 
Switzerland 11% 
Japan 11% 
Hong Kong 5% 
China 5% 
Russia 4% 
Norway 3% 
Brazil 1% 
Singapore 1% 
Total 87% 
Source: own composition based on EUROSTAT (2015) database 
 
Regarding the wine export share across destination markets, we can conclude that USA, 
Canada, Switzerland and Japan were the biggest demand market for European wines (Table 
4). 
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Table 4 
Wine export share by export destinations, in per cent, 2000-2013 
Export destination France Italy Spain Portugal Germany 
Australia 1% 1% 1% 
 
1% 
Canada 14% 14% 11% 31% 7% 
Hong Kong 9% 1% 1% 
  Japan 20% 7% 8% 4% 12% 
Malaysia 0% 
    Mexico 1% 1% 9% 
  Norway 
 
3% 5% 5% 14% 
Philippines 
 
0% 1% 
  Russia 2% 2% 3% 
 
11% 
Singapore 2% 0% 0% 
 
1% 
South Africa 
 
0% 
   Switzerland 12% 13% 22% 14% 10% 
Thailand 1% 0% 
   United States 37% 58% 39% 46% 45% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: own composition based on EUROSTAT (2015) database 
 
Table 5 shows those wine export destinations that imported notable wine from top 5 
European wine exporters. 43.1 % of US, 14.2 % of Japanese, 10.8% of Canadian and 12.5% of 
Swiss wines were imported from the top European wine producers. French and Italian wines 
have a dominant role in the USA (with import market share at 18%) and they are moderately 
present in Japanese and Swiss wine market. Spain has only 10 % import market share in 
importer countries. Finally, we can conclude that the German and Portuguese wines were less 
significant in these export destinations. 
This result confirms the relevance of our research question and the problem to be 
investigated. In the following part, we test the convergence of panel data and seek to 
investigate whether European wine exporters can price discriminate across its export 
destinations and how the competition can be characterised in these markets (market 
structure). 
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Table 5 
The wine import of destination countries from top 5 European wine producers, 
in percent, 2000-2013 
 
France Italy Spain  Portugal Germany  
Wine importers 
     
Total 
Australia 1.6% 0.4% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 2.2% 
Canada 5.1% 3.8% 0.9% 0.6% 0.4% 10.8% 
Hong Kong 2.4% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 2.8% 
Japan 10.5% 2.3% 0.9% 0.1% 0.4% 14.2% 
Malaysia 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 
Mexico 0.4% 0.2% 0.6% 0.0% 0.1% 1.3% 
Norway 1.3% 1.1% 0.6% 0.1% 0.3% 3.4% 
Philippines 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 
Russia 2.1% 1.9% 1.1% 0.1% 0.4% 5.6% 
Singapore 3.4% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.6% 
South Africa 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 
Switzerland 5.6% 4.4% 1.9% 0.3% 0.4% 12.5% 
Thailand 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 
United States 18.6% 18.1% 3.7% 1.0% 1.7% 43.1% 
Total 51% 33% 10% 2% 4% 100% 
Source: own composition based on World Bank WITS database (2014a) 
REGRESSION RESULTS 
Before estimating the PTM regression, variables was pre-tested for serial correlation and 
cross-sectional dependence (CD). The Wooldridge (2002) tests confirm the existence of serial 
correlation in case of France and Germany. Pesaran (2004) CD test reveals cross-sectional 
dependence in all variables (Table 6). 
Table 6 
Tests for serial correlation and cross section dependence 
 France Italy Spain Germany Portugal 
 lnxuv lnxrate lnxuv lnxrate lnxuv lnxrate lnxuv lnxrate lnxuv lnxrate 
Wooldridge 
(2002) test  0.0040 0.1520 0.8470 0.0182 0.0611 
Pesaran 
(2004) CD 
test 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Own calculations based EUROSTAT (2015) and European Central Bank, Statistical Data 
Warehouse database (2015) 
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Before estimating the panel regression models, the main model variables are pre-tested 
for unit root tests. We performed second generation panel unit root tests to take into account 
the impacts of cross-sectional dependence (CD) employing 0-4 time lags (Maddala and Wu, 
1999; Peseran 2007). The second generation panel unit root tests reject the hypothesis of 
non-stationary (Annex 1) for French wine unit values and exchange rates variables. As 
concerns Italy, Spain, Germany and Portugal, the wine unit values do not contain unit roots 
while the exchange rates do, except French data. Consequently, we have found evidence 
against the existence of panel unit root in export unit values. In other words, the main 
variables are stationary. Therefore, we employed panel corrected standard error models 
(PCSE) - which controls for heteroscedasticity -  with AR(1) type of autocorrelation for France 
and Germany and PCSE without AR(1) for Spain, Italy and Portugal.  
Table 7 presents the estimation results analysing the exchanges rate effect on wine export 
prices (detailed data can be found in Annex 2). Based on the estimation results, France was 
able to apply price discrimination across Australian, Hong Kong’s, Mexican and United 
States’ wine export markets (positive significant exchange rate effects - βi; and significant 
country effects - λi). Moreover, beside France, Italy was also able to control their wine export 
prices in Japanese, Mexican and the American markets (positive PTM effects). The other 
countries such as Spain, Portugal and Germany could not pursue price discrimination in their 
EU extra wine export destinations. Accordingly the H1 hypothesis can be only partly 
confirmed. 
Concerning the coefficients of Canada, Russia, South Africa, Switzerland (French wine 
prices), Singapore, Hong Kong (Italian wine prices) and Philippines (Spanish wine prices), 
they have significant country (λi) and a negative significant exchange rate effects (negative 
βi), revealing that local-currency price stability (LCPS) was higher than PTM effects in this 
countries, for entire period (Table 7). 
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Table 7 
PTM regression result for top five EU wine exporter 
  France Italy Spain Portugal Germany 
Destination 
country 
exchange 
rate effect 
countr
y effect 
asymmetric 
effect 
exchange 
rate effect 
country 
effect 
asymmetric 
effect 
exchange 
rate effect 
countr
y effect 
asymmetric 
effect 
exchange 
rate effect 
country 
effect 
asymmetr
ic effect 
exchange 
rate effect 
country 
effect 
asymmetric 
effect 
AUSTRALI
A 
PTM 
effect +*** 
depreciatio
n -*** + 
appreciatio
n - - - NA NA NA -*** - + 
CANADA LCPS +*** 
appreciatio
n -*** + + -*** - 
appreciatio
n -*** - + -** - depreciation 
HONG 
KONG 
PTM 
effect -*** 
depreciatio
n LCPS + - - - - 
      JAPAN + +** + PTM effect -** - - - + + - - + - - 
MALAYSIA +*** 
omitte
d - NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
MEXICO 
PTM 
effect +** + PTM effect -*** + -*** - + NA NA NA NA NA NA 
NORWAY NA NA NA -** omitted + - 
omitte
d + - omitted + - omitted + 
PHILIPPIN
ES  NA NA NA + - - LCPS +*** + NA NA NA NA NA NA 
RUSSIA LCPS +*** + - - - -*** + + NA NA NA -*** + - 
SINGAPOR
E + +*** 
depreciatio
n LCPS +*** + -* - 
appreciatio
n NA NA NA - - - 
SOUTH 
AFRICA LCPS +*** + +* + - NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
SWITZERL
AND LCPS +*** + -* + + -*** - - - - + +*** - + 
THAILAND +** - + +*** - + NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
UNITED 
STATES 
PTM 
effect +*** - PTM effect -** + -*** - + -*** - + +*** - + 
Note: In case of France, Malaysia in all other cases Norway was treated as intercept.  
NA – because of the lack of observations balanced panel data were not available. 
If the coefficient of asymmetric effect is statistically significant and has a positive sign, the effect of appreciation of exporter’s currency exchange rates on export prices is greater 
than in depreciation. Similarly, a significant and negative coefficient of asymmetric effect implies that the effect of depreciation of exchange rates on export prices is greater than 
appreciation (Byrne et al., 2010). 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: Own calculations based EUROSTAT (2015) and European Central Bank, Statistical Data Warehouse database (2015) 
The analysis of the asymmetric effects of exchange rates on wine export prices indicates 
that in some cases (in relation of France and Germany) the depreciation of Australian, Hong 
Kong’s; Singapore’s dollar had a greater impact than the appreciation relative to the Euro. 
Between France and Canada as well as France and Australia, the appreciation of Euro to 
the Canadian and Australian dollar had higher effect than depreciation. Regarding Italy, the 
appreciation of Australian dollar in Euro exceeded the effect of depreciation, respectively in 
relation of Canada-Germany. Positive and statistically significant asymmetric effects were 
estimated for France and Canada, between Italy and Australia, Spain and Canada together 
with Singapore. 
Results indicate that many French and Italian wine export markets were not competitive 
during the period analysed, in other words, these countries were able to price discriminate 
across their EU extra destination markets suggesting monopolistic competition. In Canada, 
Russia, South Africa, Switzerland, Hong Kong, Singapore and Philippines the local currency 
price stability was higher than PTM effects between 2000 and 2013.  
The analysis of the asymmetric effects of exchange rates on wine export prices revealed 
that in many cases (France, Portugal, and Germany) the depreciation Euro relative to 
Australian, Hong Kong’s; Singaporean dollar had a greater effect than the appreciation while 
in other cases (France-Canada, Australia-Italy, Spain-Canada, Spain-Singapore) appreciation 
of Euro exceeded the effect of depreciation. The PTM model indicates the presence of non-
competitive pricing behaviour of major EU wine exporters due to both the market specific 
characteristics as well as exchange rate effects. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite of the empirical evidence in agri-food sector, analysing the pricing to market 
behaviour in wine trade has understudied yet. However, it is crucial to investigate whether 
the world largest EU wine exporter countries are able to price discriminate across their wine 
export destinations. Our study investigated the price discrimination behaviour of France, 
Italy, Spain, Portugal and Germany applying PTM model for a period of 2000 and 2013. 
Moreover, the asymmetric effects of exchange rates were also investigated. We elaborated a 
strongly balanced panel data set including monthly wine export data for EU extra wine export 
destination countries. 
In sum, our estimations suggest that France was able to apply price discrimination in 
Australia, Hong Kong, Mexico and United States. Beside France, Italy had market dominance 
in Japanese, Mexican and the American markets (positive PTM effects). In the case of other 
countries such as Spain, Portugal and Germany, the price discrimination behaviour in EU 
extra wine export markets could not observed. 
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The local-currency price stability was higher than PTM effect during the entire period in 
case of Canada, Russia, South Africa, Switzerland (French wine), Singapore, Hong Kong 
(Italian wine) and Philippines’ (Spanish wine). The results for asymmetric effects of exchange 
rates on wine export prices revealed that in many cases (in relation of France, Portugal, 
Germany) the depreciation of Euro (relative to Australian, Hong Kong’s; Singaporean and 
Canadian dollar) had a greater impact than the appreciation while appreciation of Euro to 
Australian dollar, Canadian dollar and Singaporean dollar exceeded the effect of 
depreciation. 
Further research can be extended to take into account the PTM behaviour of New Word 
wine exporter countries on European markets. 
 
17 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Beck, N. and Katz, J.N. 1996. Nuisance vs. Substance: Specifying and Estimating Time-Series 
Cross-Section Models. Political Analysis 6(1): 1-36.  
Beck, N. and Katz, J.N., 1995. What to Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section 
Data. American Political Sciences Review 89(3): 634-647.  
BNP Paribas, 2015 New producers, new consumers: the revolution of the global wine market 
http://www.bnpparibas.com/en/news/press-release/new-producers-new-consumers-
revolution-global-wine-market 20 April 2015 Accessed: 23 may 2016 
Breitung, J., and Pesaran, M. H. 2008. Unit roots and cointegration in panels. Springer 
Berlin Heidelberg p. 279-322  
Byrne, J.P., Chavali, A.S., Kontonikas, A., 2010. Exchange rate pass through to import prices: 
Panel evidence from emerging market economies. Business School - Economics, 
University of Glasgow, pp. 1–31. Working Paper 19. Accessed July 2015, available at 
https://ideas.repec.org/p/gla/glaewp/2010_19.html 
Choi, I. 2001. Unit root tests for panel data. Journal of International Money and Finance, 
20(2): 249–272.  
Coelho, A. M., Couderc, J-P. 2006 Globalisation + Financialisation = Concentration? Recent 
trends on mergers, acquisitions and financial investments in the wine sector. 3rd 
International Wine Business and Marketing Research Conference, Montpellier, 6-7-8 
July 2006 Working Paper 
Dawson, P., Gorton, M. Hubbard, L., Hubbard, C., 2014 Effectiveness of International 
Markets: Pricing to Market Analysis. International comparisons of product supply chains 
in the agro-food sectors: determinants of their competitiveness and performance on EU 
and international markets. European Union, COMPETE project. Available at: 
www.compete-project.eu 
European Central Bank 2015, Statistical Data Warehouse database, Reports, Statistics 
Bulletin, Exchange rates, Bilateral exchange rates Available on the Internet: 
http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browseSelection.do?DATASET=0&FREQ=M&CURRENCY=&
node=bbn233 Accessed: 20/02/2015 
EUROSTAT 2015, International Trade database. Wine export data (HS-6 level, product code 
220421 in Euro and in kg). Available on the Internet: Available on the Internet: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database Accessed: 02/02/2015 
Fedoseeva, S., and Werner, L. M. 2016 How linear is pricing-to-market? Empirical 
assessment of hysteresis and asymmetry of PTM. Empirical Economics, 50(3): 1065-1090 
Gafarova, G., Perekhozhuk, O., and Glauben, T. 2015. Price discrimination and pricing-to-
market behavior of black sea region wheat exporters. Journal of Agricultural and Applied 
Economics, 47(03), 287-316. 
Goldberg, P. K. and Knetter, M.M. 1999. Measuring the intensity of competition in export 
markets. Journal of International Economics 47(1): 27-60.  
Goldberg, P.K. and Knetter, M.M. 1997. Goods prices and exchange rates: What have we 
learned?', Journal of Economic Literature 35(3): 1243.  
Griffith, G. and Mullen, J. 2001. Pricing to market in NSW rice export markets The 
Australian journal of agricultural and resource economics 45(3): 323-334  
Im, K., Pesaran, H., and Shin, Y. 2003. Testing for unit roots in heterogeneous panels. 
Journal of Econometrics 115(1): 53–74.  
18 
 
Jin, H. 2008. Competitive structure of Canadian wheat exports in the world market. Applied 
Economics Letters 15(13): 1059-1064.  
Knetter, M.M. 1993. International comparisons of pricing-to-market behaviour, American 
Economic Review 83 (3): 473-486.  
Krugman, P. 1986. Pricing to Market When the Exchange Rate Changes.Working Paper No. 
1926. Cambridge, MA, National Bureau of Economic Research.  
Krugman, P. 1987. Pricing to market when exchange rate changes. In Arndt, S.W. & 
Richardson, J. D. (eds), Real Financial Linkages Among Open Economies. Cambridge, 
MA and London: MIT Press, 49-70.  
Lavoie, N. 2005 Price Discrimination in the Context of Vertical Differentiation: An 
Application to Canadian Wheat Exports, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 87 
(4): 835–854.  
Maddala, G. S., and Wu, S. 1999. A comparative study of unit root tests with panel data and a 
new simple test. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 61(S1): 631–652.  
Pall, Z., Perekhozhuk, O., Glauben, T., Prehn, S. and Teuber, R. 2011 Wheat trade - does 
Russia price discriminate across export destinations? Leibniz Institute of Agricultural 
Development in Transition Economies (IAMO) Forum 2011, No. 15 
Pall, Z., Perekhozhuk, O., Glauben, T., Prehn, S. and Teuber, R. 2014. Residual demand 
measures of market power of Russian wheat exporters, Agricultural Economics 45: 381–
391.  
Pall, Z., Perekhozhuk, O., Teuber, R. and Glauben, T. 2013. Are Russian wheat exporters able 
to price discriminate? Empirical evidence from the last decade, Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 64(1): 177-196.  
Pesaran, H. 2004. General Diagnostic Tests for Cross Section Dependence in Panels, 
University of Cambridge Working Paper, 0435.  
Pesaran, M. H. 2007. A simple panel unit root test in the presence of cross‐section 
dependence. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 22(2), 265-312.  
Pick, D.H. and T.A. Park 1991. The competitive structure of U.S. Agricultural Exports. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 73 (1): 133–141.  
Pick, D.H., C. A. Carter 1994. Pricing to Market with Transactions Denominated in a 
Common Currency, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 76 (1): 55–60.   
Saghaian, S. H. and Reed, M. R. 2004. Integrating Marginal Cost into Pricing-to-market 
Models for U.S. Agricultural Products. A Journal of the Canadian Agricultural Economics 
Society Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues Number 5 p 187-203  
Varma, P. and Issar, A. 2016. Pricing to market behaviour of India’s high value agri-food 
exporters: an empirical analysis of major destination markets. Agricultural Economics 
47(1): 129-137  
Vergil, H., 2011. Does trade integration affect the asymmetric behavior of export prices? The 
case of manufacturing exports of Turkey. African Journal of Business Management. 
5(23), 9808–9813. 
19 
 
Annex 1: Second Generation unit root test and PTM regression results 
 
Second Generation Panel Unit Root Tests for France 
 Maddala and Wu (1999) 
Panel Unit Root test (MW) 
Pesaran (2007) 
Panel Unit Root test (CIPS) 
  without trend with trend without trend with trend 
Variable lags p-value p-value 
lnuvx 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
lnuvx 2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
lnuvx 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
lnuvx 4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
lnxrate 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
lnxrate 2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
lnxrate 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
lnxrate 4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Own calculations based EUROSTAT (2015) and European Central Bank, Statistical Data Warehouse database 
(2015) 
 
Second Generation Panel Unit Root Tests for Italy 
 Maddala and Wu (1999) 
Panel Unit Root test (MW) 
Pesaran (2007) 
Panel Unit Root test (CIPS) 
  without trend with trend without trend with trend 
Variable lags p-value p-value 
lnuvx 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
lnuvx 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
lnuvx 3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
lnuvx 4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
lnxrate 1 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 
lnxrate 2 0.272 0.822 0.834 0.091 
lnxrate 3 0.580 0.981 0.953 0.401 
lnxrate 4 0.757 0.989 0.960 0.361 
Own calculations based EUROSTAT (2015) and European Central Bank, Statistical Data Warehouse database 
(2015) 
 
Second Generation Panel Unit Root Tests for Spain 
 Maddala and Wu (1999) 
Panel Unit Root test (MW) 
Pesaran (2007) 
Panel Unit Root test (CIPS) 
  without trend with trend without trend with trend 
Variable lags p-value p-value 
lnuvx 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
lnuvx 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
lnuvx 3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
lnuvx 4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
lnxrate 1 0.283 0.935 0.988 0.967 
lnxrate 2 0.372 0.981 0.995 0.994 
lnxrate 3 0.211 0.953 0.989 0.990 
lnxrate 4 0.072 0.811 0.996 0.995 
Own calculations based EUROSTAT (2015) and European Central Bank, Statistical Data Warehouse database 
(2015) 
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Second Generation Panel Unit Root Tests for Portugal 
 Maddala and Wu (1999) 
Panel Unit Root test (MW) 
Pesaran (2007) 
Panel Unit Root test (CIPS) 
  without trend with trend without trend with trend 
Variable lags p-value p-value 
lnuvx 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
lnuvx 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
lnuvx 3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
lnuvx 4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
lnxrate 1 0.260 0.742 0.742 0.368 
lnxrate 2 0.356 0.857 0.857 0.167 
lnxrate 3 0.219 0.730 0.730 0.138 
lnxrate 4 0.282 0.805 0.805 0.170 
Own calculations based EUROSTAT (2015) and European Central Bank, Statistical Data Warehouse database 
(2015) 
 
Second Generation Panel Unit Root Tests for Germany 
 Maddala and Wu (1999) 
Panel Unit Root test (MW) 
Pesaran (2007) 
Panel Unit Root test (CIPS) 
  without trend with trend without trend with trend 
Variable lags p-value p-value 
lnuvx 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
lnuvx 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
lnuvx 3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
lnuvx 4 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
lnxrate 1 0.448 0.689 0.719 0.137 
lnxrate 2 0.594 0.897 0.756 0.216 
lnxrate 3 0.432 0.862 0.721 0.198 
lnxrate 4 0.434 0.848 0.769 0.241 
Own calculations based EUROSTAT (2015) and European Central Bank, Statistical Data Warehouse database 
(2015) 
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Annex 2 PTM regression results 
Exporter 
countries 
France (AR1) Italy Spain Portugal Germany (AR1) 
Destination 
country 
VARIABLES 
exchang
e rate 
effect 
country 
effect 
asymmetr
ic effect 
exchang
e rate 
effect 
country 
effect 
asymmetri
c effect 
exchange 
rate effect 
country 
effect 
asymmetri
c effect 
exchang
e rate 
effect 
countr
y effect 
asymmetri
c effect 
exchange 
rate effect 
country 
effect 
asymmetri
c effect 
                
AUSTRALIA 0.261* 1.165*** -0.172*** 
-
1.087*** 0.159 0.158* -0.107 -0.527 -0.0263 NA NA NA -0.528*** -1.480 0.0522 
 
(0.140) (0.334) (0.0602) (0.182) (0.204) (0.0834) (0.180) (0.498) (0.0865) 
   
(0.170) (1.384) (0.0768) 
CANADA 
-
0.642*** 1.247*** 0.0668* 
-
0.849*** 0.102 -0.0212 -1.546*** -0.183 0.144** 
-
0.547*** -0.121 0.0343 -0.602** -1.570 0.0939*** 
 
(0.134) (0.329) (0.0392) (0.207) (0.200) (0.0774) (0.167) (0.492) (0.0644) (0.177) (0.551) (0.0684) (0.274) (1.383) (0.0360) 
HONG KONG 1.107*** -1.005*** 
-
0.0519*** 
-
0.525*** 0.374** -0.0115 -0.224 -0.693 -0.0356 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
 
(0.111) (0.370) (0.0118) (0.0929) (0.189) (0.0458) (0.269) (0.783) (0.0344) 
      JAPAN 0.0304 1.014** 0.000244 0.588*** -0.941*** -0.0200 -0.0157 -1.130 0.00309 0.106 -0.876 -0.00222 0.134 -2.158 -0.00691 
 
(0.0560) (0.412) (0.00262) (0.137) (0.357) (0.0195) (0.0995) (0.710) (0.0062) (0.101) (0.741) (0.00621) (0.159) (1.580) (0.00503) 
MALAYSIA 0.657*** omitted -0.0424 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
 
(0.237) 
 
(0.0322) 
            MEXICO 0.115* 0.772** 0.00645 0.368*** -2.049*** 0.00314 -0.163*** -0.230 0.0182 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
 
(0.0635) (0.368) (0.0107) (0.0570) (0.322) (0.00347) (0.0620) (0.526) (0.0112) 
      
NORWAY NA NA NA 
-
0.200**
* omitted 0.0197 -0.359 omitted 0.0086 -0.412 
omitte
d 0.00191 -0.722 omitted 0.00324 
    
(0.0717) 
 
(0.0144) (0.240) 
 
(0.0101) (0.267) 
 
(0.0119) (0.661) 
 
(0.00747) 
PHILIPPINES  NA NA NA -0.113 0.0239 -0.0176 -0.996*** 2.331*** 0.00495 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
    
(0.364) (0.773) (0.0162) (0.140) (0.736) (0.0103) 
      
RUSSIA 
-
0.556*** 2.539*** 0.00654 -0.0997 -0.0826 -0.00520 -0.721*** 0.663 0.0206 NA NA NA -1.108*** 1.600 
-
0.000526 
 
(0.172) (0.683) (0.0113) (0.207) (0.858) (0.0162) (0.131) (0.684) (0.0130) 
   
(0.138) (1.466) (0.00874) 
SINGAPORE 0.204 1.292*** -0.122*** 
-
0.800**
* 2.442*** 0.0213 -0.603* -0.178 0.199* NA NA NA -0.274 -0.959 -0.0314 
 
(0.172) (0.323) (0.0449) (0.161) (0.559) (0.0148) (0.340) (0.560) (0.117) 
   
(0.395) (1.400) (0.130) 
SOUTH 
AFRICA 
-
0.518*** 1.583*** 0.0154 0.354** 0.247 -0.0399 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
 
(0.120) (0.334) (0.0389) (0.171) (0.212) (0.0584) 
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SWITZERLAND 
-
0.518*** 1.583*** 0.0154 -0.664* 1.687 0.00964 -0.678*** -0.253 -0.0787 
-
0.00489 -0.564 0.0364 0.747*** -1.431 0.000836 
 
(0.120) (0.334) (0.0389) (0.374) (1.429) (0.0196) (0.0917) (0.498) (0.0499) (0.122) 
(0.548
) (0.0596) (0.276) (1.385) (0.108) 
THAILAND 0.589** -1.212 0.00867 0.251*** -0.292 0.0269 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
 
(0.297) (1.100) (0.0112) (0.0458) (0.184) (0.0476) 
         
UNITED 
STATES 0.161*** 1.228*** -0.0165 0.341** -1.143*** 0.000487 -0.626*** -0.448 0.0505 
-
0.932**
* -0.204 0.127 0.316*** -1.710 0.0493 
 
(0.0414) (0.330) (0.0400) (0.157) (0.387) (0.0271) (0.0443) (0.501) (0.0428) (0.0941) 
(0.553
) (0.0991) (0.0676) (1.381) (0.0482) 
Constant -0.621* 
  
1.435*** 
  
2.000*** 
  
1.854*** 
  
2.872** 
  
 
(0.331) 
  
(0.187) 
  
(0.501) 
  
(0.553) 
  
(1.381) 
  Observations 1,848 
  
2,184 
  
1,848 
  
840 
  
1,344 
  Number of cid 11 
  
13 
  
11 
  
5 
  
8 
  R-squared 0.527     0.599     0.755     0.614     0.804     
Note: In case of France, Malaysia in all other cases Norway was treated as intercept.  
NA – because of the lack of observations balanced panel data were not available. 
If the coefficient of asymmetric effect is statistically significant and has a positive sign, the effect of appreciation of exporter’s currency exchange rates on 
export prices is greater than in depreciation. Similarly, a significant and negative coefficient of asymmetric effect implies that the effect of depreciation of 
exchange rates on export prices is greater than appreciation (Byrne et al., 2010). 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own calculations based EUROSTAT (2015) and European Central Bank, Statistical Data Warehouse database (2015) 
 
